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CIVIL RIGHTS

Sexual Orientation Discrimination Headed to High Court?
With appeals courts in Chicago, Atlanta split on protections under ‘64 Civil Rights Act, issue ripe for review
BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD

I

n what could prove a pivotal step in the long road
toward full equality under
the law, Lambda Legal has
announced it will petition the Supreme Court to decide whether Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which bans employment discrimination because of sex, also bans
discrimination that is based on
sexual orientation.
Lambda signaled its intentions on
July 6, after the 11th Circuit Court
of Appeals, based in Atlanta, announced that its full bench would
not reconsider a three-judge panel
decision from March 10 rejecting a
sexual orientation discrimination
claim by Jameka K. Evans, a lesbian
security guard, against her former
employer, Georgia Regional Hospital.
The argument that Title VII
should be interpreted to cover sexual orientation claims got a big boost
several months ago when the full
bench of the Chicago-based Seventh Circuit ruled that a lesbian
academic, Kimberly Hively, could
sue an Indiana community college
for sexual orientation discrimination under the federal sex discrimination law, overruling prior panel
decisions from that circuit.
The Seventh Circuit was the first
federal appeals court to rule that
the 1964 Act provided such protections. Lambda Legal represented
Hively in that appeal.
Interestingly, Title VII did not
even include sex as a prohibited
ground of discrimination when the
Civil Rights Act got to the floor of
the House of Representatives for
debate. The measure’s primary focus was race discrimination. But a
Virginia representative, Howard W.
Smith, an opponent of the bill, introduced a floor amendment to add
sex, in an apparent effort to add
a poison pill making the measure
too controversial to pass. Smith’s
amendment won the support of
similarly-minded
conservatives
but also from liberals interested in
advancing the employment rights
of women. Smith’s effort backfired
when the amended bill passed the
House and was sent to the Senate.
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Jameka K. Evans’ discrimination suit against her former employer, Georgia Regional Hospital, could end
up at the Supreme Court.

There, a lengthy filibuster over
the race discrimination provision
delayed a floor vote for months,
but when it was eventually passed,
there was not much discussion
about the meaning of sex as a prohibited ground for employment discrimination. (The sex provision did
not apply to other parts of the 1964
Act, so employment protections are
the only portion of that statute that
outlawed sex discrimination.)
Within a few years, both the
Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and federal
courts had issued decisions rejecting discrimination claims from
LGBTQ plaintiffs, holding that
Congress did not intend to address
homosexuality or transsexualism
(as it was then called) in the 1964
law. That judicial consensus did not
start to break down until after the
Supreme Court’s 1989 “sex-stereotyping” decision in Ann Hopkins’
sex discrimination case against
Price Waterhouse. There, the high
court concluded Hopkins was illegally denied partnership because
senior members of the firm believed
she did not conform to their image
of a proper “lady partner.”
Within a few years, litigators began to persuade federal judges that
discrimination claims by transgender plaintiffs also involved sex
stereotyping. By definition, a transgender person does not conform to
stereotypes about their sex as designated at birth, and by now a near
consensus has emerged among the
federal courts of appeals that discrimination because of gender identity or expression is a form of sex

discrimination under the stereotyping theory. The EEOC changed its
position as well, following the lead
of some court decisions, in 2012.
Advocates for gay plaintiffs also
raised the stereotyping theory, but
with mixed success. Most federal circuit courts were unwilling to accept
it unless the plaintiff could show
that he or she was gender-nonconforming in some obvious way, such
as effeminacy in men or masculinity
(akin to the drill sergeant demeanor of Ann Hopkins) in women. The
courts generally rejected the argument that discrimination based on
an employee’s homosexual or bisexual orientation, in and of itself, was
proof that their employer impermissibly acted based on stereotypes of
how a man or woman was supposed
to act. Some appellate courts, including the New York-based Second
Circuit, ruled that if sexual orientation was the “real reason” for discrimination, a Title VII claim must
fail, even if the plaintiff was gendernonconforming.
Within the past few years, however, several district courts and the
EEOC accepted the stereotyping
argument and other arguments insisting that discrimination because
of sexual orientation is always, as
a practical matter, about the sex of
the plaintiff. But it was only this
year that a federal appeals court
— the Seventh Circuit in the Hively
case — came around to this view.
A split among the circuits about
the interpretation of a federal statute is a key predictor of a case the
Supreme Court is likely to accept
for review. Until now, the high court

has always rejected the invitation to
consider whether Title VII could be
interpreted to cover sexual orientation and gender identity claims,
leaving in place lower court rulings
that found otherwise.
In 2016, however, the high court
signaled its interest in the question whether sex discrimination,
as such, includes gender identity
discrimination when it agreed to
review a ruling by the Richmondbased Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that the district
court should not have dismissed a
sex discrimination claim by Gavin
Grimm, a transgender high school
student. Grimm, who was denied
access to the boys’ bathroom appropriate to his gender identity by his
Gloucester County, Virginia, school,
filed suit under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which
bans sex discrimination by schools
receiving federal money.
The Fourth Circuit found that
the district court should have deferred to the Obama administration’s Department of Education
interpretation of the Title IX regulations, which tracked the EEOC and
federal courts in Title VII cases and
accepted the sex stereotyping theory
for gender identity discrimination
claims. Shortly before the Supreme
Court was scheduled to hear arguments in the Grimm case, however,
the Trump administration withdrew
the Obama DOE interpretation,
pulling the rug out from under the
Fourth Circuit’s decision. The Supreme Court canceled the argument
and sent the case back to the Fourth
Circuit, which this fall will hear argument on the question whether Title IX would protect a claimant like
Grimm even without an interpretation from the Executive Branch.
Meanwhile, the Title VII issue
has been percolating in many
courts around the country. Here
in New York, several recent Second
Circuit appellate rulings, citing existing circuit precedent, have denied sexual orientation discrimination claims. In some of those
cases, judges said that the gay
plaintiff could maintain their Title
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informed Boatright of the results
in early 2015, Boatright became
emotional and seemed very sincere. Boatright told Mr. Osco that
he had been in a relationship for
two years and the only other person he had sexual contact with was
M.H. Boatright declined to name
his partner, but indicated that he
had told the partner about the possibility Boatright had HIV and his
partner had thereafter tested negative.” In response to Osco informing Boatright about the 2011 test
result, “Boatright maintained that
he was never contacted by anyone
about it.”
During his own testimony, Boatright basically admitted he lied to
Osco about his boyfriend’s HIV status, stating that “his partner, who
he was dating at the time he engaged in sexual conduct with M.H.,
testified positive for HIV in March
2013.” According to Boatright’s
testimony, however, the two men
waited to have sex until after his
boyfriend’s viral load was undetectable and also used condoms.
Boatright also acknowledged
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VII case if they could show gendernonconforming behavior sufficient
to evoke the stereotyping theory.
And in one case, the circuit’s chief
judge wrote a concurring opinion
suggesting it was time for the full
bench to reconsider the issue. In
another case, Zarda v. Altitude Express, the court recently granted a
petition for such reconsideration,
with oral argument scheduled for
September 26. The EEOC, many
LGBTQ rights and civil liberties
organizations, and the attorneys
general of the three states in the
circuit — New York, Connecticut,
and Vermont — have filed amicus
briefs, calling on the Second Circuit to follow the Seventh Circuit’s
lead on this issue.
The timing in the 11th and Second Circuit cases makes for an
interesting dynamic. Lambda’s
petition for Supreme Court review
of the 11th Circuit case must be
filed within 90 days of the denial
of its rehearing petition — that is,
by early October. Georgia Regional
Hospital would then have 30 days
to respond, so a Supreme Court de-
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that he and M.H. engaged in unprotected sex “because he thought
he was HIV-negative.”
The major point of contention
in the case was whether Boatright
could be charged with criminal liability based on the evidence that
he knew about his HIV status when
he had sex with M.H. His defense
depended on his testimony that he
genuinely thought he was HIV-negative and first learned he was positive when M.H. contacted him. Set
against this was the testimony by
Chapman, the CLS Plasma nurse,
that she had counseled Boatright
about his HIV status in December
2012, which Boatright denied in
court, and Osco’s testimony confirming that a record of Boatright’s
2011 positive test result was in the
Ohio reporting database.
In appealing his conviction and
sentence, Boatright argued first
that the statute was unconstitutional, but his attorney had not
raised that objection during the
trial, so the appeals court found he
had lost his chance to make this
argument.
Boatright also contended that
the trial judge should have dis-

missed the case rather than sending it to the jury, on grounds of insufficient evidence for a conviction,
but the appeals court rejected this
out of hand, finding that in sorting through the contradictory evidence, the jury could reasonably
have reached the conclusion that
Boatright knew about his HIV-positive status and lied to M.H. before
they had sex. The court emphasized that Boatright even admitted during his testimony to having
lied more than once — including
when he filled out plasma donation
forms and failed to disclose that
he was a sexually active gay man
who should have been rejected as
a donor.
Boatright explained that he did
this because he was opposed to the
categorical exclusion of gay men as
donors. He “wanted to help people
and did not think that his sexual
orientation should prevent him
from donating,” he testified.
Carr’s opinion for the court stated, “After a thorough, independent
review of the record, we conclude
that the jury did not lose its way in
finding Boatright guilty of felonious assault. The jury was present-

ed with two competing views of the
evidence.” The appeals court would
not overturn the verdict “merely
because the trier of fact opted to
believe the testimony of a particular witness.”
The court also rejected Boatright’s challenge to the length of
his sentence, observing that the
range provided by the statute was
between two and eight years, so a
five-year sentence was comfortably
within the range.
Nor would the court entertain
Boatright’s argument that his trial
attorney presented an ineffective
defense by failing to raise a constitutional objection to the statute,
pointing out that another appeals
panel in Ohio had recently rejected
a constitutional attack on the statute. Given the strong presumption
of constitutionality accorded to
statutes and Boatright’s failure to
cite any legal authority to support
the claim that it was a viable argument, the appeals court was unwilling to find fault with his trial
attorney.
Boatright was represented in his
appeal by Akron attorney James
K. Reed.

cision on whether to take the case
could well not come until late October, early November, or later. If the
court accepts the case, oral argument would follow in early 2018,
with a decision by next June.
The question then is how expeditiously the Second Circuit would
move in the Zarda case. Legal observers generally believe the circuit
is poised to follow the Seventh Circuit’s lead in holding that sexual
orientation claims can be litigated
under Title VII, but the circuit’s
judges may see it as prudent to hold
up until the Supreme Court either
rejects review of the 11th Circuit
case or rules on it.
However, two veteran Second
Circuit judges have recently bucked
the circuit precedent, arguing it is
outmoded and refusing to dismiss
sexual orientation cases. A few
years ago, the circuit accepted the
argument in a race discrimination
case that an employer violated Title VII by discriminating against a
person for engaging in a mixed-race
relationship. Some judges see this
as support for the analogous argument that discriminating against
somebody because they are attract-

ed to a person of the same-sex is
sex discrimination.
It’s worth noting that in the past
the Second Circuit moved to rule
quickly on an LGBTQ issue in a
somewhat similar situation. When
lawsuits challenging the Defense of
Marriage Act were moving through
the federal courts in 2012, there
was a race among cases from the
Second Circuit, Boston’s First Circuit, and San Francisco’s Ninth
Circuit. The Supreme Court had
already received a petition to review a First Circuit case — where
GLAD, the GLBTQ Legal Advocates
& Defenders, represented the plaintiffs — before the Second Circuit
heard the American Civil Liberties
Union’s suit on Edie Windsor’s behalf. But the Second Circuit moved
quickly, and in the end it was the
ACLU-Windsor case the high court
accepted. On June 26, 2013, ruling
in the Windsor case, the Supreme
Court gutted the key provision of
DOMA.
If the Second Circuit moves quickly again, it could turn out an opinion
before the Supreme Court has announced whether it will review the
11th Circuit Evans case. The timing

might be just right for that.
A key concern for LGBTQ legal
advocates, of course, is the Supreme
Court’s composition at the time this
issue is decided. Right now, the fivejustice majority in the DOMA case
and the marriage equality case two
years later holds. But three of them
— Justices Anthony Kennedy (who
turns 81 this month), Ruth Bader
Ginsburg (84), and Stephen Breyer
(79 next month) — represent the
court’s oldest members, and there
have been persistent rumors about
Kennedy, who has written all the
major gay rights decision over two
decades, considering retirement.
Donald Trump’s first appointee
to the Court, Neil Gorsuch, replacing the late arch-homophobe Antonin Scalia, immediately showed
his own anti-LGBTQ colors with a
disingenuous dissent from a June
26 high court ruling that the 2015
marriage equality decision compels
Arkansas to list both mothers on
their child’s birth certificate. Another appointment like Gorsuch from
Trump would seriously jeopardize
the chances for any further progress on LGBTQ rights and equality
in the foreseeable future.
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